1	Erik McLain (SBN 219008) MCLAIN LAW FIRM, PC	
2	Medaliv Barr Filler, 10	FILED SUPERIOR COURT, METROPOLITAN DIVISION COUNTY OF KERN
3		MAY - 3 2011
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5	Attorneys for Plaintiff	TERRY MONALLY, CLERK BYDEPUTY
6	BRON SANDERS	
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8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
9	COUNTY OF KERN	
10	BRON SANDERS, an individual,	Case No :C 1500 ov amakon
11		Case No.:S-1500-CV- 273582
12	Plaintiff,	COMPLAINT FOR: 1. WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN
13	v\$.)	VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
14	TEJON RANCH COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; TEJON RANCHCORP, an	2. FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEAL PERIODS;
15 16	unknown business entity; and DOES 1 through) 20, inclusive,	
17	Defendants.)	4. FAILURE TO PAY WAGES EARNED;
18))	5. WAITING-TIME PENALTIES UNDER LABOR CODE § 203;
19)))	6. FAILURE TO PROVIDE ACCURATE ITEMIZED WAGE STATEMENTS IN
20)	VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE § 226;
21)	7. UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 17200; and
23)	8. REPRESENTATIVE ACTION UNDER PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERALS'
24)	ACT
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- 8	COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES	

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Plaintiff Bron Sanders hereby files this Complaint against defendants Tejon Ranch Company, Tejon Ranchcorp., and Does 1-100. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis, alleges as follows:

THE PARTIES

- Plaintiff Bron Sanders ("Mr. Sanders" or "Plaintiff") is an individual and citizen
 of the State of California, residing in Kern County, California, where he has lived and worked at
 all times relevant to this action.
- 2. Defendant Tejon Ranch Company is a Delaware corporation. Tejon Ranchcorp., a California corporation, is a subsidiary of Tejon Ranch Company, and was the joint and integrated employer of Mr. Sanders. (Tejon Ranch Company and Tejon Ranchcorp. shall be collectively referred to in this Complaint as "Tejon Ranch"). Tejon Ranch is a diversified real estate development and agribusiness company whose principal asset is its 270,000-acre land.
- 3. Mr. Sanders sues Defendants DOES 1 through 100 under fictitious names. Their true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, are unknown to Plaintiff. When Plaintiff ascertains their true names and capacities, he will seek permission from this Court to amend the Complaint to insert the true names and capacities of each fictitiously named defendant. Plaintiff is informed and believes that each of these fictitiously named defendants is responsible in some manner for the occurrences alleged herein, and that these defendants directly and proximately caused Plaintiff's damages.
- 4. On information and belief, at all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendants, including the fictitiously named defendants, were the servants, employees, joint employers, integrated employers, alter egos, successors-in-interest, subsidiaries, affiliated companies or corporations, and joint venturers of the other Defendants, and were, as such, acting within the course, scope and authority of each other Defendant. Plaintiff further alleges on information and belief that each of the Defendants acted in concert with, and with the consent of, each of the other Defendants, and that each of the Defendants ratified or agreed to accept the benefit of the conduct of each of the Defendants.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 5. This Court has jurisdiction over all causes of action asserted in this Complaint pursuant to the California Constitution, Article VI, Section 10, California Business & Professions Code Section 17204, and California Code of Civil Procedure Section 410.10 by virtue of the fact that this is a civil action wherein the matter in controversy, exclusive of interest, exceeds \$25,000, and because this case is a cause not given by statute to other trial courts.
- 6. Venue is proper in Kern County under California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 395 and 395.5 because (i) one or more of the acts, breaches, and other wrongful conduct giving rise to the causes of action asserted herein occurred or was to be performed in Kern County, California; (ii) the obligations to be performed by Tejon Ranch were to be performed in Kern County, California; and (iii) Tejon Ranch's California office is located in Kern County, California.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

- 7. Mr. Sanders commenced employment as a hunting guide for Tejon Ranch in or about February 2004. Since that time up until he was wrongfully terminated in December 2010, Mr. Sanders performed his job duties satisfactorily and received regular wage increases from Tejon Ranch. In addition, hunters regularly requested Mr. Sanders' services as a hunting guide on the Ranch.
- 8. Tejon Ranch states on its website that it prides itself on the "responsible stewardship of its land by placing the principles of conservation and good stewardship at the core of everything it does." Moreover, Tejon Ranch holds itself out in the community as a responsible steward of the property owned by Tejon Ranch in Kern County (hereafter, the "Ranch"). These claims are, however, a sham. Tejon Ranch is not a responsible steward of the land, but rather engages in unlawful land use practices, including those more fully described below.
- Throughout his employment with Tejon Ranch, Mr. Sanders was directed, as a condition of retaining his employment, to engage in unlawful mountain lion hunting on the

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Ranch. Specifically, Mr. Sanders' supervisors, Joe Ryan and Don Geivet (the Vice President of Ranch Operations), required Mr. Sanders and other hunting guides to engage in unlawful mountain lion hunting on the Ranch.

- 10. Hunting guides who participated in the lion hunts not only were permitted to keep their jobs but were rewarded with special perks, including being granted special hunting tags for deer and bear on the Ranch, as well as additional work hours. In other words, the guides' job security and income were negatively affected if they did not participate in the hunts at Mr. Ryan's and Mr. Geivet's direction.
- 11. The culture and motto on the Ranch with respect to the unlawful mountain lion hunting was, and remains, "shoot, shovel, and shut up." Below are just a few of many examples of the unlawful hunting on the Ranch over the past few years:
 - A. A few months prior to Mr. Sanders' wrongful termination, Darrell Francis shot a mountain lion with a 17 HMR without any depredation permit. Mr. Francis shot the mountain lion 12 times. Mr. Geivet noted this unlawful killing in his logbook.
 - B. Leo Fisher has treed and killed over 30 lions on the Ranch in the past several years, mostly without depredation permits.
 - C. In 2005, Mr. Sanders had a depredation permit to kill one mountain lion. After Mr. Sanders killed the mountain lion, Mr. Geivet instructed him not to turn the lion into the Department of Fish & Game, but to kill as many mountain lions as he could while the depredation permit was open. This is in direct contravention of the depredation permit, which required the lion be turned over to the Department of Fish & Game within 24 hours of the kill.
 - D. Joe Ryan lives on the Ranch and hunts lions two to three times per week throughout the year, often more than that in the winter and the spring when it is easier to track the mountain lions. Mr. Ryan typically hunts with his son Jake Ryan, who has bragged about the fact that he and his father have killed almost 100 lions on the Ranch without depredation permits.

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Mr. Sanders has personally witnessed Joe Ryan treeing and killing six mountain lions without depredation permits.

E. Each of the hunting guides, including Cody Plank, Steven Ryan, and Darrell Francis have participated in mountain lion hunting with Joe Ryan.

- E. Each of the hunting guides, including Cody Plank, Steven Ryan, and Darrell Francis have participated in mountain lion hunting with Joe Ryan and Leo Fisher. These hunts typically took place without depredation permits. After each hunt, the guides reported back to Mr. Gievet, who asked questions and recorded information in his hardbound logbook.
- F. When TRC would receive a depredation permit, it was all hands on deck. Every hunting guide who was not on a hunt was told to head in a different area of the Ranch to look for a lion to shoot, ignoring the requirement to start the lion tracking within a certain distance from the reported livestock kill.
- G. Although Mr. Geivet generally kept the unlawful hunting limited to hunting guides, hunting members who leased various hunting areas on the Ranch were also asked to participate in the unlawful hunts in exchange for special treatment. Mr. Geivet told numerous hunting members who leased hunting areas to shoot mountain lions without permits.

The above-identified conduct is in violation of Fish & Game Code §§ 4800 et seq., which designates mountain lions as a "specially protected mammal," which makes it illegal to kill or injure any mountain lion without a special permit issued by the Department of Fish & Game.

12. Mr. Geivet was not only well aware of the unlawful mountain lion hunting, he actively encouraged the conduct. In fact, he kept a logbook of the unlawful hunting occurring on the Ranch. Moreover, numerous individuals heard Mr. Geivet ask hunting guides and hunting members who reported lion sightings, "Did you shoot it?" In addition, Mr. Geivet often attempted to create false reasons for unlawfully killing the mountain lions. For example, Mr. Geivet instructed hunting guides to shoot mountain lions and then falsely claim that they were in fear of their lives to support the unlawful killings.

- 13. In April or May 2010, Mr. Sanders witnessed Joe Ryan and his son, Jake Ryan, kill a mountain lion without a depredation permit. Mr. Sanders complained to Joe Ryan about the ongoing unlawful hunting practices on the Ranch. Mr. Sanders also complained to Mr. Geivet regarding the unlawful hunting on the Ranch. Mr. Sanders specifically objected to the ongoing hunting of mountain lions without depredation permits. Mr. Sanders asked that the Ranch cease this unlawful practice and, to the extent it would not, that he not be required to participate in the unlawful conduct.
- 14. Immediately following Mr. Sanders' complaints to Mr. Ryan and Mr. Geivet, they began retaliating against Mr. Sanders. Among other things, Mr. Geivet removed Mr. Sanders from hunts even though customers had specifically requested Mr. Sanders as their hunting guide. Instead, Mr. Sanders was often relegated to more menial tasks, causing a substantial decrease in his income, both in regular wages and tips.
- 15. In an effort to stop the ongoing retaliation, which Mr. Sanders feared would eventually lead to his termination, Mr. Sanders reported the unlawful conduct to Teri Bjorn in Tejon Ranch's Legal Department. Ms. Bjorn expressed concern regarding the unlawful conduct occurring on the Ranch, and she told Mr. Sanders that she would protect him from further retaliation and ensure that his complaints were fully investigated.
- 16. Following her discussion with Mr. Sanders, Ms. Bjorn then reported the unlawful mountain lion hunting and retaliation to Robert Stine, the President and CEO of Tejon Ranch. Rather than conduct an informed investigation of the retaliation being perpetrated against Mr. Sanders, Mr. Stine immediately met with Mr. Geivet, the main culprit of the retaliation, to put a stop to Mr. Sanders' complaints.
- 17. During Mr. Stine's meeting with Mr. Geivet, Mr. Geivet told Mr. Stine that Mr. Sanders was armed and should be considered dangerous. A review of Mr. Sanders' personnel records reflects no comments regarding him being dangerous or having any characteristics that would suggest a propensity toward dangerous conduct. Nonetheless, based on these ridiculous and inflammatory allegations, Mr. Geivet convinced Mr. Stine that the best course of action was to terminate Mr. Sanders' employment the next day. Mr. Stine agreed with

Mr. Geivet. In other words, rather than investigate the unlawful hunting practices and retaliation to which Mr. Sanders was being subjected, Mr. Stine sided with the Mr. Geivet, who was not only aware of the illegal hunting practices, but also aware that Mr. Sanders was not dangerous.

- 18. The day after seeking assistance from Ms. Bjorn to stop the unlawful retaliation, Tejon Ranch terminated Mr. Sanders' employment without explanation in a meeting with Mr. Geivet and a human resources representative. Although Mr. Sanders demanded an explanation, none was provided.
- 19. In fact, there is no explanation (other than unlawful retaliation) for Mr. Sanders' sudden termination as is evidenced by Mr. Geivet's own conduct preceding the termination. For example, two days before Tejon Ranch terminated Mr. Sanders' employment, Mr. Geivet issued to Mr. Sanders a new annual permit to access the Ranch to perform his job duties. Had Mr. Geivet and Tejon Ranch intended to terminate Mr. Sanders' employment two days later, there would have been no reason to issue him an annual permit. As another example, the Friday before Mr. Sanders' employment was terminated, Mr. Geivet prepared a work schedule that reflects Mr. Sanders being scheduled to work on December 10-12, 2010, including participating in a wild pig management hunt. Mr. Sanders' employment was terminated a few days later on December 10, 2010, the day after he sought help from Tejon Ranch's Legal Department. If Tejon Ranch and Mr. Geivet had plans to terminate Mr. Sanders' employment on December 10th, it would not have included him on the schedule to work after December 10th. The evidence points to one undeniable conclusion: Tejon Ranch did not intend to terminate Mr. Sanders' employment prior to his complaint to Teri Bjom on December 9, 2010.
- 20. Due to the retaliation committed against him, Mr. Sanders suffered severe emotional distress, including believing he was suffering from a heart attack. Mr. Sanders continues to suffer emotional distress from Tejon Ranch's unlawful conduct.

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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)

- Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 20 above, and incorporates them herein.
- At all times relevant to this action, Fish & Game Code §§ 4800 et seq. were in 22. effect, and delineated fundamental, substantial, and well-established policy that benefits the public at large. In fact, Section 4800(c) makes any violation of the Section "a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars (\$10,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment."
- After Mr. Sanders' complained about Tejon Ranch's violations of Section 4800 et seq., and refused to continue to participate in Tejon Ranch's unlawful conduct, Tejon Ranch retaliated against him, including wrongfully terminating his employment.
- As a proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, loss of past and future earnings, and other benefits of employment, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount according to proof at trial, but which exceeds the minimum jurisdictional of this Court.
- As a further proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered, and 25. continues to suffer, severe emotional distress and lasting humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, and other incidental and consequential damages and expenses, all to Plaintiff's damage according to proof at trial.
- Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thercon alleges, that Defendants 26. committed the acts described herein deliberately, callously, maliciously, fraudulently, and in an oppressive manner intended to injure Plaintiff, and that such improper motives amounted to malice in conscious disregard of Plaintiffs' rights. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages from Defendants in an amount according to proof at trial.

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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEAL PERIODS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)

- Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 26 above, and incorporates them herein.
- 28. The applicable Wage Order provides that "[n]o employer shall employ any person for a work period of more than five (5) hours without a meal period of not than 30 minutes, except that when a work period of not more than six (6) hours will complete the day's work the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and employee. Unless the employee is relieved of all duty during a 30 minute meal period, the meal period shall be considered an 'on duty' meal period and counted as time worked."
- 29. California Labor Code § 226.7 provides that any employer who fails to provide a meal period mandated by an applicable Wage Order must "pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of compensation for each work day that the meal . . . period is not provided."
- 30. As a matter of common practice, Defendants failed to authorize and permit Plaintiff to take meal breaks as provided by law (including failing to authorize, permit and/or provide a minimum 30-minute, duty-free meal break) and failed to pay him an additional hour of pay in lieu of providing meal breaks as required by Labor Code § 226.7.
- 31. As a result of Defendants' failure to comply with their obligations under the law, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount subject to proof at time of trial but including *inter alia* the additional hour of pay for each missed meal break (Labor Code § 226.7), attorneys' fees (Labor Code § 218.5), prejudgment interest on the amount of the additional pay owed (Labor Code § 218.6) and such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(FAILURE TO PROVIDE REST PERIODS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)

32. Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 8 above, and incorporates them herein.

- 9 -

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

- 33. The Wage Orders provide that "every employer shall authorize and permit all employees to take rest breaks, which insofar as practicable shall be in the middle of each work period. The authorized rest period time shall be based on the total hours worked daily at the rate of ten (10) minutes net ret time per four (4) hours or major fraction thereof."
- 34. California Labor Code § 226.7 provides that any employer who fails to provide a rest break mandated by an applicable Wage Order must "pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of compensation for each work day that the . . . rest period is not provided."
- 35. As a matter of common practice, Defendants failed to authorize and permit Plaintiff to take rest breaks as provided by law, and further, failed to pay him an additional hour of pay in lieu of providing rest breaks as required by Labor Code § 226.7.
- 36. As a result of Defendants failure to comply with their obligations under the law, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount subject to proof at time of trial but including *inter alia* the additional hour of pay for each missed meal break (Labor Code § 226.7), attorneys' fees (Labor Code § 218.5), prejudgment interest on the amount of the additional pay owed (Labor Code § 218.6) and such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(FAILURE TO PAY REGULAR AND OVERTIME WAGES EARNED AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)

- 37. Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 36 above, and incorporates them herein.
- 38. California law defines "hours worked" to mean "the time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer," In connection with his work for Tejon Ranch, Plaintiff was often required to remain on the Tejon Ranch's premises during the work shift specifically, to supervise hunters on the Ranch. Plaintiff did not have an agreement that would provide that Plaintiff would not be paid for this time, even though he was subject to Tejon Ranch's control and could not leave the hunters unattended in the cabins. Hence, Plaintiff

was required to be paid for all the hours that he was required to remain with the hunters, since he was subject to the company's control.

- 39. Plaintiff was not, however, paid for all of the hours he was subject to Tejon Ranch's control, meaning that he not only did not receive regular pay for this time but also overtime pay if warranted.
- 40. Instead of paying Plaintiff for all hours worked, Defendants would require Plaintiff to clock out before his workday was completed and clock in after his workday had already commenced such that Plaintiff received no wages at all for significant blocks of time.
- 41. As a result of Defendants' failure to comply with their obligations under the law, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount subject to proof at time of trial but including inter alia unpaid wages, including overtime wages, prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs and such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(WAITING-TIME PENALTIES UNDER LABOR CODE SECTION 203 AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)

- Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through
 41 and incorporates them herein.
- 43. Labor Code § 201 provides in relevant part: "If an employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately."
- 44. Labor Code § 203 provides in relevant part: "If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction, in accordance with Section 201 . . . any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days." It further provides that "[s]uit may be filed for these penaltics at any time before the expiration of the statute of limitations on an action for the wages from which the penalties arise."

- 45. Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiff final wages within the timeframe provided in Labor Code § 201, including meal break premiums, rest break premiums, and regular and overtime wages.
- 46. Plaintiff is entitled to recover daily wages up to a maximum of thirty days under Labor Code § 203 plus attorneys' fees, interest and such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(FAILURE TO PROVIDE ACCURATE ITEMIZED WAGE STATEMENTS

IN VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE SECTION 226 AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)

- 47. Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 46 above, and incorporates them herein.
- 48. Labor Code § 226(a) sets forth reporting requirements for employers when they pay wages, including that "[e]very employer shall, semimonthly or at the time of each payment of wages, furnish each of his or her employees . . . an accurate itemized statement in writing showing (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the employee . . . (5) net wages earned . . . (9) all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee."
- 49. Labor Code § 226(e) provides "An employee suffering injury as a result of a knowing and intentional failure by an employer to comply with subdivision (a) is entitled to recover the greater of all actual damages or fifty dollars (\$50) for the initial pay period in which a violation occurs and one hundred dollars (\$100) per employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period, not exceeding an aggregate penalty of four thousand dollars (\$4,000), and is entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees."
- 50. Defendants failed to accurately record and disclose to Plaintiff on Plaintiff's wage statement(s) all of the additional wages due to him, including those wages fraudulently denied. Plaintiff was injured in that the omissions led Plaintiff to believe Plaintiff was not

entitled to be paid these wages. In addition, Defendants did not include all of the above-listed information on Plaintiff's itemized wage statements.

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51. As a result of Defendants' unlawful acts, Plaintiff requests recovery of Labor Code § 226(e) statutory penalties according to proof plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs and such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 17200 AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)

- 52. Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 51 above, and incorporates them herein.
- Defendants' unlawful failure to pay wages as alleged herein constitutes unfair business practices within the meaning of Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.
- 54. As a result of Defendants' unfair competition as alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and lost money or property, including having been deprived of Plaintiff's right to wages due as alleged herein.
- 55. Pursuant to Business & Professions Code § 17203, Plaintiff is entitled to restitution of all wages and other monies owed and belonging to Plaintiff, including interest thereon, that Defendants wrongfully held from Plaintiff and retained for themselves by means of their unlawful and unfair business practices, is entitled to injunctive relief to prevent the continuance of Defendants' unlawful and unfair business practices, is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, the substantial benefit doctrine and/or the common fund doctrine and pray for recovery of such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

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